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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF INDIANA
ART=U Li. GILLIOm*
There is no single subject related to the administration of the crim-
inal law in Indiana that is brought to the consideration of our courts
as much in recent times as that of searches and seizures. This was
to be expected under a policy of enforcing universal abstention from
the use of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes by law and by
law enforcement officers.
In general, it is conceded by all that the state has the right, through
its officers, to make reasonable searches and seizures in aid of the en-
forcement of the criminal code; also that the individual has the right to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. But there is not
always unanimity of view on questions of whether given searches and
seizures are reasonable or unreasonable; or on questions of whether
given search warrants are valid or invalid; or on questions of ad-
missibility or inadmissibility in evidence of information and of articles
procured through given searches and seizures.
The conflict between concepts of the right of the state to make
reasonable searches and seizures on one side, and concepts of the right
of the individual to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures on the other side is indeed conducive to much litigation. The
reasons for wide differences in these concepts are several. Whatever
the reasons for these clashing views may be, they are being presented in
thousands of cases annually in our lower courts, and in scores of
cases appealed to the Supreme Court of our state. The decisions of
this court on the subject have nearly all been rendered in the past
two or three years.
These observations will be confined to the constitutional and statu-
tory provisions of this state on the subject and to their interpretation
and application by the Supreme Court of Indiana.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The provision in our state constitution' is,
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses
papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure shall
* See biographical note p. 83.
Sec. 11, Art. I, Const. of Indiana.
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not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized."
The right which the people thus guaranteed to themselves against
themselves was not a new right but is only the expression of the right
claimed at common law.2 It might seem that a politically free people
which held to rights of individual freedom such as that stated in Sec-
tion 11 of the Bill of Rights, would not have considered it necessary
to guarantee this right against themselves in the formation of a rep-
resentative government under which sovereignty rested in themselves.
But they were apparently apprehensive that power, by whomever
exercised, under whatever theory or form of government, might at
times be exercised arbitrarily, and therefore they guaranted the con-
tinued existence of this and other fundamental rights and thereby
inhibited their representatives in government against their abridge-
ment.
It is obvious that the concept of individual freedom which is ex-
pressed in the constitutional provision against unreasonable searches
and seizures was something definite and fixed and well understood.
There was no dispute or debate in the constitutional convention over
the meaning of the language used.
The same right is expressed in most of the various state constitutions
and in the federal constitution. It is, of course, obvious that the
purpose was not to afford a shield to the guilty. The purpose was
only to guard against unreasonable searclts and seizures, such as
were sometimes experienced in England under the general warrants
of search and seizure. The continued existence of the right depends
on its enforcement whenever violated, and it may occur that a guilty
person occasionally benefits from its enforcement, but if that occurs
it is an inescapable incident to the preservation of the right to the
people generally rather than an object or purpose of the right or of
its enforcement.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES WITHOUT PROCESS OF WARRANT
The most controversial question arising from the language used in
See. 11 of the Bill of Rights is over the meaning of the term "un-
reasonable." There is no inhibition against searches and seizures
without process of warrant, except against those which are unreason-
able. These controversies arise most frequently in connection with
searches of automobiles for intoxicating liquors. The right exists to
search a person, and within limits, his property, without process of
search warrant, when under lawful arrest.
The Supreme Court of Indiana has recognized this right on the
part of the state. Thus, it has been held3 that a person lawfully
2 Cary et al v. Sheets, 67 Ind. 375, 577.
3 Jameson v. State, Ind. 149 N. E. 51 Haverstick v. State, Ind. 147 N. E.
625.
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arrested for driving an automobile at an unlawful rate of speed could
not complain that the search of his automobile and of packages in the
automobile without a search warrant, was unreasonable, and intoxicat-
ing liquor seized under such search was held admissible in evidence
in the trial of the charge of unlawful transportation of intoxicating
liquor.
Arrests are sometimes made without warrant and the validity of
searches and seizures made pursuant to such arrests is brought in
question. An officer can always make an arrest when either a mis-
demeanor or a felony is committed in his view. A lawful arrest may
be made without a warrant on information that a felony has been
committed. The driver of an automobile may be arrested without a
warrant upon information that he has committed the felony of trans-
porting liquor; and, in such a case, it has been held that the search of
the automobile could be lawfully made without a search warrant.4
In this case, the automobile containing the liquor had temporarily
come to rest.
One who is arrested by a policeman for violating a traffic regula-
tion in the operation of an automobile and who voluntarily discloses
that he has liquor in the automobile cannot complain of a search of the
automobile without a search warrant and cannot successfully object
to the introduction of evidence thus procured in a trial on a charge
of unlawfully transporting liquor.3
But an officer can only make a lawful arrest for the commission of
a misdemeanor when it is committed in his view. Police officers have
no authority, in view of Section 11 of Article 1 of the Constitution, to
break into and search private rooms without a warrant for the mere
purpose of discovering evidence that a misdemeanor has been, or is
being, committed, or of arresting a person suspected of committing
one.6
No authority exists to make searches and seizures without search
warrants for the purpose of discovering evidence of whether the law
is being violated. The case just referred to so holds. The Supreme
Court recently held7 the search of a man's house unlawful, and the
evidence procured inadmissible, where it appeared that certain offi-
cers, acting under a search warrant for the search of the premises of
another found nothing and then without any other warrant proceeded
"to search the neighborhood" and without prior information that
the law was being violated entered the premises of the defendant and
forced their way into the house to learn what, if anything, they could
find.
4 Budreau v. State, Ind. 149 N. E. 442.
5 Berry v. State, Ind. Cause No. 24,737, Jan. 26, 1926.
6 Hart v. State, 145 N. R. 492.
7 Dumas v. State, Ind. 150 N. E. 24.
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There is, under some circumstances, authority in officers to make
arrests and searches and seizures without warrants for either, when
there is probable cause for believing that the law is being violated.
What constitutes such probable cause always depends on the facts.
The facts must be such as to furnish reasonable cause for believing
that the law is being violated and the officers must act on such belief."
In a case decided by the Supreme Court in March of this year it
was held that probable cause existed for believing that liquor was be-
ing unlawfully transposted and a search made on such belief was not
unreasonable. In this case the evidence disclosed that officers, acting
upon information that liquor was about to be taken to a certain place,
went and hid in a shed on the place in which many empty cans were
found which had contained "mule." Presently the defendant drove
up to the place in an automobile, stopped, raised up a lid in the back
of the car and, in view of the officers, raised a five gallon container
like those in the shed. Hearing the officers coming, the defend'-t
placed the container back and locked the part of the car in which it
was placed. The defendant was then arrested and the officer un-
locked the car and took out the container which was full of alcohol.
A search is unreasonable and unlawful, however, when probable
cause does not exist and officers act only on suspicion or on a "drag-
net" plan for the purpose of ascertaining whether the law is being
violated, and the evidence thus procured is not admissible. Thus, it
was recently held" that the statement of a searching officer that the
defendant was a known "bootlegger" was not sufficient to show prob-
able cause that the defendant was unlawfully transporting liquor in
his automobile.
So, too, the stopping and searching of an automobile on a public
highway where not even a suspicion of law violation existed prior
to the attempt to search was held unreasonable and unlawful."
Another case of this character was decided similarly recently. The
evidence showed that two deputy sheriffs and two policemen, while
driving in an automobile on a highway just after dark, saw the light
of an approaching automobile one-fourth mile away. The officers
dimmed their lights and the approaching driver responded by doing
the same and both drivers dimmed their lights the second time. As
the cars came to the point of passing each other, one officer jumped
out and ordered the defendant to stop his car, which was occupied
by the defendant and his wife. The officers then commanded the
man and his wife to alight and then proceeded to search the car.' 2
8 Eiler v. State, Ind. 149 N. E. 62; Robinson v. State, Ind. 149 N. E. 891;
Batts v. State, Ind. 144 N. E. 22.
9 Thomas v. State, Ind. 146 N. E. 850.
'0 Robinson v. State, Ind. 149 N. E. 491.
"1 Batts v. State, Ind. 144 N. E. 22.
12 Eiler v. State, Ind. 149 N. E. 62.
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The right to search premises, other than automobiles, without a
search warrant has been sustained under the following circumstances;
the premises consisted of a cleared patch of ground 15x20 feet in
dimension on the bank of a river and which was occupied by the de-
fendants as a fishing camp; it appeared that the officers gained en-
trance from the surrounding land, of which the cleared patch was
a part, by permission of the owner; and that the officers, while near
the patch, had a reasonably plain view of a still in operation on the
premises.3
The only case decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana relative
to the search of a dwelling house without a search warrant, and with-
out invitation to search, is that of Dumas v. State.14 In that case, it
was held that the search was unlawful. There the officers had not
even a suspicion of any violation before they entered the premises on
which the house was situate, but they testified that as they approached
the house they smelled evidence of a still in operation.
It is to be expected that in case of a search of a dwelling without
the lawful arrest of the occupant on the premises and without a search
warrant and in the absence of an invitation to search, great care, to
say the least, would be exercised by the courts before such a search
would be held lawful, if at all.
In a recent case before the Supreme Court of the United States a
man was arrested several blocks away from his dwelling which was
searched after the arrest without authority of a warrant. TheCourt
held that the search of the dwelling without a search warrant was
under the circumstances unreasonable and unlawful and was, in it-
self abhorrent to our laws.'5
If there is an invitation to search premises the unreasonableness or
unlawfulness of the search cannot afterwards be asserted. What con-
stitutes an invitation to search is not always easy to determine. In a
ease where the defendant told an officer, who had entered his bar-
room without a search warrant, "go ahead and searen," it was held
that the evidence procured was admissible and that its admissibility
was not necessarily determined by the fact that it was seized while
the defendant committed the crime of violating the prohibition law in
their presence since he told them to search." But in the case of
Meno v. State'7 (1925), it was held that the statement of the occupant
of a building to an officer that he might search the building is not an
invitation to search when the officer exhibits a search warrant. Con-
sent to search is co-ercive under such circumstances.
13 Sade and Bingham v. State, Ind. 150 N. 1. 24.
14 Dumas v. State, Ind. 149 N. E. 24.
15 Agnelol et al v. U. S., Vol. 46 Sup. Ct., Rep. 4.
16 Hess v. State, 192 Ind. 50.
172Meno v. State, Ind. 148 N. E. 420.
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE BY PROCESS OF' WARRANT
Searches and seizures by authority of search warrants are forbidden
in the constitution unless such warrants are issued upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and unless they particularly
describe the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
The most general statute relating to the issuance of search warrants
that is in force in this state is the Act of 190518 which authorizes jus-
tices of the peace to issue warrants to search any house or place for a
variety of named articles under the various circumstances named in
the act.
Provision is also made in particular criminal statutes for the is-
suance of such warrants, as for example in the prohibition act' 9 now
in force in this state, which provides that:
"If any person shall make an affidavit before any mayor, jus-
tice of the peace, or judge of any court that such affiant has rea-
son to believe and does believe that on any described or designated
premises or tract of land, there is intoxicating liquor or a still or
distilling apparatus which is being sold, bartered, used, or given
away, or possessed, in violation of the laws of this state, such
justice of the peace, mayor or judge shall issue his warrant to any
officer having power to serve criminal processes, and cause the
premises designated in such affidavit to be searched as in other
cases where such warrants are issued as now provided by law."
A similar provision existed in the original prohibition act of 1917.20
It has been held2' that the language "make an affidavit before
any mayor," etc., must be construed with the provisions in the general
Act of 190522 and of an Act of 1907,23 which are to the effect that no
warrant for search shall be issued until there has been filed with the
issuing officer an affidavit describing the house or place to be searched,
the things to be searched for and alleging substantially the offense in
relation thereto, and that the affiant believes and has good cause to
believe that such things as are to be searched for are there concealed
and, if search is under the liquor statute, that they are kept for un-
lawful purposes. And it was held in the same case that when so con-
strued the provision for making an affidavit before a mayor, etc., does
not conflict with Section 11 of Article I of the Constitution. In the
same case, it was also held that the affidavit on which the warrant
issued must be filed before the warrant is issued and that there is no
filing unless the affidavit is delivered to the proper officer for the
purpose of being kept on file by him in the proper place. In that case,
the clerk of the court was the proper officer to receive the affidavit
18 Sec. 2085 Burns' Ann. Stat. 1926.
19 Chapter 48, Acts 1925.
20 Chapter 4, Acts 1917.
21 Thompson -v. State, 190 Ind. 363.
22 Sec. 2085 Burns' Ann. Stat. 1926.
23 Sec. 8340, Burns' t S. 1914.
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for fling and the failure to so file it with him invalidated the search
warrant and the proceedings thereunder.
But the recording of the filing of such affidavit is not essential
to the validity of the search warrant issued thereon if, with the pur-
pose to file it, the affidavit is deposited with the officer charged with
the duty to receive and place it on file and is received and retained
by him for that purpose.2
4
Strict compliance with all formalities for the issuance and execution
of search warrants is required. Thus, it has been held, the description
of the premises to be searched in an affidavit for a search warrant
must be so specific as to leave no discretion to the officer as to what
place he is to search, but must fully direct him to the particular
premises.2 5  In the case just referred to, a description, viz: "See
D, Beech Grove, Section 21, Township 15 north, Range 4 east, in the
City of Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana," was held insufficient.
So, too, a description, viz: "Residence and all outbuildings located
on Grants 31 and 32, near Deadman's Hollow in the township of
Jeffersonville, of said county and state" was held insufficient.26
But the description of premises as "No. 116 East Ohio Street, Indi-
anapolis, Ind." was held sufficient to authorize a search of a building
at 114 East Ohio Street which connected with the one known as No.
116Y. The evidence showed that the building at No. 114 was con-
nected with that at 116 by a hallway, was in the exclusive possession
of the defendant who was in possession of the one at No. 116, and that
it was so connected as to be a part of No. 116, reachable only by means
of the entrance to No. 116 East Ohio Street. Other cases have been
decided on the question of sufficiency of description, but those re-
ferred to are illustrative of how the rule is applied. The certainty of
description required for a deed of conveyance is sufficient in a search
warrant.
28
The affidavit for a search warrant need not state the name of the
person whose premises are to be searched-it is sufficient if it de-
scribes the articles which are to be seized and states that they are
kept by a person or persons unknown.2"
A search warrant is not invalid by reason of the omission of the
seal of the justice of the peace who issued it from the jurat to the
affidavit on which it was issued.30
The office of a search warrant is not to authorize a search for the
purpose of discovering or procuring evidence on which to base a
24Morgan v. State, 194 Ind. 39.
25 Flum ii. State, 193 Ind. 585.
26 Phipps v. State, Ind. 143 N. E. 287.
27 Donnely v. State, Ind. 144 N. E. 472.
28 Rose V. State, 171 Ind. 602.
29Boyd v. State, Ind. 143 N. E. 355; Thompson v. State, Ind., 147 N. E.
778.
o Stapert v. State, Ind. 143 N. E. 587.
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prosecution. There must be probable cause for believing that the law
is being violated and that the articles sought are on the premises to be
searched, and all this must appear in an affidavit which must be filed
before the warrant may issue.31 Search warrants are available only
to the state in aid of enforcement of the criminal law.3 2 Informa-
tion gained pursuant to the execution of a valid search warrant is,
of course, admissible in evidence to prove that an offense has been
committed.
The legislature has provided that the probable cause contemplated
by Section 11 of Article I of the Constitution may be shown by affi-
davit made on information and belief. It has been held that this
statutory provision does not violate the said section, and a warrant
issued upon such an affidavit is valid.33
Only one search of premises described in a search warrant can be
made under such warrant, and if used again any information gained
as a result of such subsequent search is inadmissible.3 4
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE ROCURED UNDER UNLAWFUL SEARCH
The courts of appeal generally hold that information acquired and
articles seized in the course of an unlawful search are not admissible
it, evidence in the trial of one whose person or premises have thus been
searched.
The burden is, however, on the defendant to show the unlawfulness
of the search and seizure. And failure to object to the admission in
evidence of such information or articles constitutes a waiver.35
The affidavit for a search warrant and the warrant itself need not
be introduced in evidence to render liquors seized admissible in evi-
dence when there is no objection to oral testimony that the officer
had a search warrant and seized the liquor in the execution of the
warrant.38
The right to object to such evidence does not, however, extend to
one who had no interest in the premises searched, though searched
unlawfully.3 7
CONCLUSION
It is obvious that there will be many questions presented for de-
cision to our Supreme Court which have thus far not been decided.
But enough has been decided so that everyone may fairly well know
the limits of authority to make searches and seizures and what the
31 Calender v. State, 193 Ind. 91.3 State v. Derry, 171 Ind. 18, 24.
3 Rose v. State, 171 Ind. 18, 24.
34 McDaniel v. State, Ind. Cause No. 24,379, Jan. 6, 1926.
35 Burgess v. State, 194 Ind. 406.36 Post v. State, Ind. Cause No. 24,824, Jan. 13, 1925.
37 Walker v. State, 194 Ind. 420; Snedegar v. State, Ind. 146 N. E. 487;
Hines v. State, Ind. Cause No. 24,860, Feb. 2, 1926.
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rights of the individual are. The Supreme Court of our state has,
throughout its existence, preserved to the people the right guaranteed
in Section 11 of the Bill of Rights without derogation on the right
of the state to make such reasonable searches and seizureq as are neces-
sary to a proper enforcement of the laws. In so doing it has per-
former well one of its highest duties.
